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Job Mission as a Substitute for Monetary Incentives: Benefits and Limits

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Job Mission as a Substitute for Monetary Incentives: Benefits and Limits

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TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2188557592

Job Mission as a Substitute for Monetary Incentives: Benefits and Limits

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https://collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2188557592

Job Mission as a Substitute for Monetary Incentives: Benefits and Limits

Full title

Job Mission as a Substitute for Monetary Incentives: Benefits and Limits

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Linthicum: INFORMS

Journal title

Management science, 2019, Vol.65 (2), p.896-912

Record Identifier

TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2188557592

Language

English

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Publication information

Publisher

Linthicum: INFORMS

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SCOPE AND CONTENTS

Contents

Many jobs are connected to a prosocial mission—namely, to a social purpose beyond profit maximization. I use three laboratory experiments to investigate if employers can use the mission to economize on monetary incentives. In my first experiment, I exogenously vary whether the agents’ effort generates a donation to a charity of their choice (matched mission), generates a donation to a charity chosen by another subject (random mission), or generates no donation (no mission). I find that the mission, whether matched or random, increases effort compared to the no-mission condition. Consistent with the theory, nonmotivated principals exploit the agents’ motivation by offering lower piece rates, whereas very motivated principals pay higher piece rates to boost the donation. I find no difference in the effort and piece rate between the matched- and random-mission conditions. In my second experiment, I use a selected pool of motivated subjects but still observe no difference between these two treatments. In my third experiment, I explore whether the effect of mission-matching may arise through gift exchange: principals decide between choosing the mission or delegating the choice to the agent. I do not find evidence that agents who are delegated the mission choice reciprocate with higher effort. These findings suggest that while a prosocial mission allows for economizing on monetary incentives, there are no further gains from increasing the quality of the mission-matching.
Data and the supplemental material are available at
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2903
.
This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics....

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Full title

Job Mission as a Substitute for Monetary Incentives: Benefits and Limits

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Record Identifier

TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2188557592

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https://collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2188557592

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ISSN

0025-1909

E-ISSN

1526-5501

DOI

10.1287/mnsc.2017.2903

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